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New trends of globalization: Do we need new theories?
by Dr. Wi Saeng Kim*

1. Theories of Globalization
Globalization is the process of corporations moving their money, factories
and products around the world to maximize a firm's value. If a domestic firm
can increase its value by investing in foreign economies, it will become a
multinational firm. The U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) were the
dominant foreign direct investment (FDI) providers with a 42.4% share of global
FDI outflows in the 1970s. Since the U.S. MNCs were major actors in
international operations during the 1960s, early FDI theories mainly focused on
the managerial behavior of U.S. multinational firms.
One of the well-accepted FDI theories is 'the monopolistic advantage
theory' of Hymer (1976), which claims that a firm invests abroad in order to
capitalize on imperfections existing in the product market. To the extent that a
multinational corporation obtains rent-yielding firm-specific assets that local
competitors do not possess, the firm can compete successfully with local firms
that have better connections and knowledge of the local market. The industrial
organization theory of Caves (1971) explains that firms in oligopolistic
industries tend to become MNCs, because they invest heavily in R&D, which
generate monopolistic rents. The product life cycle theory of Vernon (1966)
states that new products will be introduced in advanced economies because of
technological know-how and demand for new products. But as production
know-how becomes standardized over time, the production location moves from
advanced economies to lower labor cost economies. The internalization theory
postulates that FDI occurs when a firm can increase its value by internalizing its
intangible assets. Such assets may include superior production skills, patents,
marketing abilities, management skills, or consumer goodwill on brand names.
2. New trends of FDI flows
Globalization, in the form of FDI accelerated in the mid-1980s as many
developing countries received a bigger share of global FDI flows than before
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[Kim and Lyn (1987)]. Figure 1 shows that in 1989, total FDI inflows to
developed countries amounted to about $150 billion, while developing countries
received less than $30 billion of FDI inflows. Interestingly, by 1996 the
developing economies received about $130 billion of FDI and advanced
countries received over $200 billion.
Prior to the 1980s, many developing economies adopted FDI regimes that
restricted FDI inflows. Since the 1980s, however, policy makers in developing
countries realized the benefits of FDI and utilized it as a key element of their
economic development strategies. The general consensus on the impact of FDI
is that inflows from advanced countries function as a vehicle for the transfer of
technology and managerial practices that create growth-promoting efficiencies
in the recipient economies. The labor productivity of FDI recipient countries
will be improved because of the advanced equipments and machineries. The
inflow of FDI will also create new jobs. Consequently, FDI inflows are
believed to increase the economic growth rate. To this extent, at least 143
countries by 1997 had enacted FDI-specific legislation to create more favorable
conditions for FDI providers. Consequently, the share of world FDI by
emerging economies increased from 15% in 1990 to approximately 40% in
1997.
It is also interesting to note that long-term capital flows within advanced
economies were quite different from earlier FDI. In the 1950s and 1960s,
greenfield FDI was the most popular method of market entry. Since the mid1980s, cross-border mergers and acquisitions have become an increasingly
important means of entering foreign markets. According to UNCTAD, the total
value of worldwide cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose in 1996, for the
sixth year running. (UNCTAD, 2002).

3. Globalization and theoretical background
The previous discussion suggests that globalization activities create a
'win-win' scenario, for both FDI-providing MNCs in advanced countries and
FDI-receiving developing economies.
Note that the formal theory of
globalization dates back to at least as far as Adam Smith. The Wealth ofNations
(1776) claims that the free movement of goods and production factors will
increase the wealth of all nations involved. The theory suggests that it is not a
coincidence that economically developed countries were the major players with
international capital flows in the early stages of globalization. Further, several
Asian countries, referred to as newly industrialized economies, have achieved
higher economic growth rates in recent decades than other developing countries
and experienced an influx of foreign technologies and capital. For instance, Asia
and the Pacific countries received only 13% of all FDI flows to developing
countries in 1970 but this figure jumped to approximately 52% in 1997.
Another country that has experienced impressive economic growth in
recent decades is China, which also has attracted an influx of FDI. The total
stock of FDI in China has jumped from $6,251 million in 1980 to $346,694
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million in 2000. Similarly, FDI stock as a percentage of the gross domestic
product of China increased from 3.1% in 1980 to 30.9% in 1999. The gross
domestic product of China has increased from 362.4 billion Yuan in 1978 to
9,593.3 billion Yuan in 2001. Since 1993, China has been the largest recipient of
FDI in the developing world (UNCTAD, 2000).
Figure 2 shows that FDI inflows to developing countries jumped from
$33 billion in 1992 to $120 billion in 1997. We also notice that China and East
Asian countries received a large portion of world FDI flows. In contrast,
however, Latin American countries received about 53% of all FDI flows to
developing countries in the early 1970s, but their share declined to 33% in 1997
(UNCTAD, 2000).

4. Globalization and Agency Problems in recipient economies

We have seen anecdotal evidence that globalization is a powerful engine of
economic growth for the parties involved, as Adam Smith claimed. Poor
countries that receive FDI enjoy a faster economic growth and the share values
of multinational corporations (MNCs) that provide FDI are advanced. MNCs
that provide FDI immediately benefit because they can reap 'monopolistic rents'
from the intangible assets that they possess. FDI improves the employment
opportunities of local workers, and enhances the consumer welfare of
underdeveloped countries, as consumers have more choices to shop for better
prices and a higher quality of goods and services.
Then why do some developing countries receive FDI inflows, experience
rapid economic growth and later move up to a higher economic status such as
'newly industrialized economies' while other developing countries do not
receive foreign capital and technologies and stay poor? There are many possible
reasons why this happens. First, a developing country may have legal
restrictions on long-term foreign capital inflows. Second, even if there are no
legal restrictions, there may be cultural barriers to entry. Third, even if there are
neither legal restrictions nor cultural barriers to entry, the developing countries
may not present profitable FDI opportunities. The FDI provider will not take
investment projects that do not generate a positive net present value. If the
policy makers of developing countries are interested in the economic growth of
the nation, then they may give enough financial incentives so that FDI projects
will generate positive value to the FDI providers.
The agency theory of the firm by Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that
the corporate managers (agents) make business decisions based on personal
interests rather than on shareholders' (principals') interests. The managers
(agents) would do so unless they are closely monitored and fired for neglecting
shareholders' interests. This means that the agents (managers) will have more
freedom to help themselves at the expense of the shareholders (principals) in an
economy where managerial monitoring is not active and where the managerial
labor market is not competitive.
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If we apply the agency theory of the firm to a democratic nation-state,
policy makers will be the agents and the public will be the principals. The
principals (public) want economic growth and improvements in living standards.
But the agents may not necessarily pursue the policy to enhance economic
growth and living standards. The agency theory suggests that local policy
makers may be interested in personal gains and losses rather than in the
economic growth of the nation state. The policy makers may weigh the personal
benefits of FDI inflows against the personal cost of FDI inflows, rather than
evaluating whether FDI inflows will expand or contract the wealth of the nation.
To the extent that the agents currently reap rents from the public as a result of
their bureaucratic position and to the extent that the FDI inflows take away these
bureaucratic rents, the agents would not welcome FDI inflows. Instead, they
may use their power to restrict FDI inflows by erecting legal barriers or to
selectively emphasize the negative aspects of FDI inflows to the public so that
the public opinion turns against an opening of the market.
Domestic firms that enjoy monopolistic power under closed economy are
another interested party that may lose, if FDI inflows intensify. Since the FDI
providers are based in advanced countries and incoming foreign firms obtain
more advanced technologies than local producers do, domestic producers are
potentially on the losing side. Domestic producers do not like new competition
from multinational corporations, so they also have an incentive to launch a
campaign against the market opening. Resistance from domestic producers in
developing countries will be greater in countries where the corporate ownership
is entrenched and leadership is inefficient. Economic power group of these
countries may eventually yield their ownership of the national economic pie.
Therefore, they are the potential losers in globalization.
A case in point is the recent development in Africa. Because of prevalent
government corruption in many African countries, multinational corporations
kept a distance from pursuing FDI there. Therefore, in an effort to attract foreign
capital into Africa, leaders of African countries have admitted that corruption
exists in the African continent and have promised collectively to the eight richest nations that they would better monitor foreign capital inflows. Although
these eight nations welcome the movement from African leaders, FDI inflows
into Africa may not significantly increase unless profit opportunities exist in the
continent.
5. Globalization and Agency problems of FDI providers
The firm's objective is to maximize the return to shareholders within legal
limitations, whether domestic or multinational. In general, corporate managers
maximize share values to pursue their objectives. Therefore, FDI providers seek
the maximum return from their investments, so they invest in foreign economies
only when the investment project creates value to shareholders. According to the
monopolistic advantage theory of FDI, FDI providers must have technological
and/or managerial skills that local producers do not possess. By definition,
therefore, multinational corporations based on advanced economies obtain
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monopolistic advantages over local producers; and FDI providers can exploit
local consumers to a certain degree. Empirical studies have shown that
multinational corporations command a higher premium over domestic firms,
allowing multinational corporations that operate in foreign economies be
another beneficiary of globalization.
Total annual global FDI outflows amounted to $1,149 billion in 2000.
Approximately 90% of the world FDI outflows are provided by developed
economies, and about 12% is provided by US-based MNCs. Total annual global
FDI inflows amounted to $1,270 billion in 2000; developed economies received
about 79% of world FDI inflows, and the US economy received about 22% of
global FDI inflows. This suggests that most economic gains of globalization
will accrue to MNCs that are based in advanced economies.
Such a domination of FDI outflows can be viewed as an opportunity, where
an underdeveloped and weak host country can be easily exploited by the
developed and strong country, not only in economic gains but also in the
sovereignty of the nation-state. Statistical evidence and/or anecdotal
observations of historical events support the possibility of such potential. The
potential opponents of globalization are quick to use these fears as ammunition
to fight against globalization.
6. The promotion of global prosperity
We have shown that globalization is a powerful engine of world
prosperity, and we have argued that the agency problems on the issue of
globalization exist in both FDI-receiving economies and EDI-providing
companies. Both will be hurdles for speedy globalization and world prosperity,
to the extent that policy makers of FDI-recipients merely seek out their selfinterests rather than national wealth and/or corporate managers of FDI providers
pursuing short-term gains rather than long-term gains.
The undesirable scenario of globalization and world prosperity is that
while FDI providers seek the maximum return from their investments, domestic
economic power groups of FDI-recipient countries accentuate the fear of
economic 'imperialism' through FD inflows and thereby enjoy unchallenged
domestic economic power at the expense of domestic consumers. In the long
run, the pro-growth logic of globalization will prevail. But the short-term battle
is likely to be won by the domestic power groups, suggesting that the
globalization process will be further delayed.
A Pareto optimal solution to promote globalization and world
prosperity is to align the interests of both FDI providers and recipients, and
specifically to alleviate the fears of the FDI-receiving countries. If we calculate
the global wealth that a smooth process of globalization can create, and if we
calculate the contributions of each party, then we can figure out a fair way of
distributing the created wealth. To the extent that about 90% of the total global
FDI was provided by advanced economies in year 2000, initiatives to promote
the globalization should come from MNCs based in advanced economies.
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7. New trends in FDI and research questions
A couple of noteworthy trends in global capital flows have developed
in recent decades. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, when Greenfield FDI was
the most popular method of market entry, since the mid-1980s, cross-border
mergers and acquisitions have become an increasingly important means of
entering foreign markets. According to UNCTAD, the total value of worldwide
cross-border mergers and acquisitions rose in 1996, for the sixth year running.
Cross-border merger and acquisition sales totaled $274.6 billion in 1996. Most
of these were majority ownership sales (UNCTAD, 2002).
Another noticeable change in the pattern of FDI flows is that there
has been a significant shift in the regional distribution of FDI flows.
Developing countries in Asia are the driving force in the surge in FDI flows.
Developing economies have attracted a larger share of global FDI inflows.
Asian countries in particular have been recipients of more than half of the total
FDI flows into developing countries, and they have also been providers of
about 90% of total FDI outflows by developing countries. Intra-regional
investment flows make up nearly 40% of FDI in Asia and multinational
corporations in newly industrialized countries (NICs) are at the heart of this
phenomenon.
The Greenfield FDI theories for U.S. MNCs were developed and
empirically tested. For example, Errunza and Senbet (1981), Kim and Lyn
(1986), and Morck and Yeung (1991), among others, supported the
monopolistic advantage theory of FDI. These studies found that excess value
of U.S. finms is positively related to the degree of international operations.
However, there have not been strong research interests in the FDI theories for
emerging economies.
Interestingly, recent papers document that corporate environments in
emerging economies differ quite significantly from those in advanced
economies [see, for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. Unlike most U.S. corporations, firms
in emerging economies are characterized by deviations of control from cash
flow rights. These practices allow owners to gain affective control of their firm
with minimum amount of cash investment. Claessens, Djankov and Lang
(2000), La Porta, et al. (1998), Claessens, et al. (1998) report that business
group affiliation and large block-holders are prevalent features of public
corporations in Asia.
The above discussions present an interesting question about whether
U.S.-oriented FDI theories are applicable to emerging economies. The extant
FDI theories, for example, explain FDI flows from advanced economies to
developing economies. However, for intra-regional investment flows in Asia,
MNCs in emerging economies may not have firm-specific monopolistic
advantages, and therefore, may not have been motivated to capitalize the
monopolistic rents of technological advantages. A recent study by Kim (2003)
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addresses this question and, based on Korean FDI data, investigates whether
U.S.-oriented FDI theories were applicable to the case of Korean MNCs. Kim
(2003) finds that FDI for Korean multinationals resemble the Japanese model
more closely than the U.S. FDI model. Continued research interests in FDI
flows may shed light on whether the extant FDI theories can be extrapolated to
global uses, or whether we need new theories for multinational corporations in
emerging economies.
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Figure 1

FDI inflows to developed and
developing countries in 1981-1996
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Figure 2

East Asia and Latin America and
Caribbean: FDI inflows in 1991-1996
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